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Unforeseen eventsConstruction of underground structures (e.g., subway lines, railways and highway tunnels) is inherently haz-
ardous, posing risks to both workers and machinery at the site and to surrounding buildings. The presence of
groundwater may increase these risks. We develop a general probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) framework
to quantify risks driven by groundwater to the safety of underground constructions. The proposed approach
is fully compatible with standard PRA practices, employing well-developed risk analysis tools based on the
fault tree analysis method. The novelty and computational challenges of the proposed approach stem from
the reliance on a combination of approaches including extracting information from databases, solving
stochastic differential equations, or relying on expert judgment to compute probabilities of basic events.
The general framework is presented in a case study and used to estimate and minimize risks at a construction
site of an underground station for a new subway line in the Barcelona metropolitan area.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The development of an underground civil construction below the
water table requires rigorous and careful planning. Groundwater is
a key element in most construction projects (Forth, 2004).Water
may undermine construction reliability and safety since it exerts
extra loads on linings, induces mechanical instabilities, and might
enhance environmental pollution from work sites. Soil heterogeneity
and insufficient subsurface characterization render accurate predic-
tions of safety and reliability elusive. Examples of soil-related failures
of underground structures built below the water table include the
collapse of the Seoul (South Korea) subway tunnel (Shin et al.,
2006) and that of a metro station in Cologne (Germany) (Rowson,
2009), holes at the construction of the High Speed Train tunnel in
Barcelona (Pujades et al., 2011) and cave-ins in a number of places in-
cluding the Nicoll Highway Station (Singapore), an excavation site in
Kaobsung (Taiwan) and a subway station in Shanghai (China)
(Ishihara and Lee, 2008). These unforeseen events during the excava-
tion works can lead to serious problems (de Rienzo et al., 2008),Barcelona, Spain. Tel.: +34
ado).
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(Hislop, 1999).
Given the high frequency of failures related to the ubiquitous un-
certainty about subsurface environments, the existence of numerous
examples on the assessment of risk of underground constructions
should come as no surprise (e.g., Einstein, 1996; Sturk et al., 1996;
Anderson, 1998; Seward et al., 2000; Choi et al., 2004; Eskesen et
al., 2004; Ghosh and Jintanapakanont, 2004; Hong et al., 2009;
Šejnoha et al., 2009; Aliahmadi et al., 2011). The abundance of cases
turns out in a wide variety of methodological approaches. We focus
on analyses aimed at identifying basic events contributing to the fail-
ure of a construction site and to analyze them by means of fault trees,
leaving the determination of probabilities of basic events to “expert
judgment”, databases and stochastic differential equations. For exam-
ple, the risk analysis of a tunnel excavation below the water table
used empirical data from a number of underwater tunnels to identify
poor ground conditions, high water pressure, and heavy rainfall as
basic events contributing to tunnel failure (Hong et al., 2009). The
evaluation of the probability for each accident path and its quantifica-
tion was obtained by averaging the assessments of four experts.
Expert assessments of subsurface processes tend to be either de-
terministic or at best rely on a few Monte Carlo realizations to repre-
sent system parameter uncertainty (Tartakovsky and Winter, 2008).
More rigorous uncertainty quantification efforts in hydrogeology typ-
ically rely on the variance of system states as a measure of predictive
uncertainty (e.g., Rubin, 2003). Since relationships between system
states and system parameters are nonlinear and often nonlocal, the
Table 1
Description of soil layers and their properties.
Layer Formation Soil type Hydraulic conductivity (m/day)
1 Shallow aquifer Fine sand with gravel 20
2 Shallow aquifer Silty clay 0.001
3 Shallow aquifer Silty sand with gravel 5
4 Aquitard Silt and clay 0.001
5 Aquitard Sandy silt 0.5
6 Aquitard Silty clay with sand 0.005
7 Aquitard Sandy silt 0.5
8 Aquitard Silt and clay 0.001
9 Aquitard Silty clay with sand 0.005
10 Aquitard Sandy silt 0.5
11 Main aquifer Silty clay with sand 0.025
12 Main aquifer Gravel and sand 150
36 A. Jurado et al. / Engineering Geology 125 (2012) 35–44former are expected to be highly non-Gaussian, so that knowledge of
their variances is insufficient to predict probabilities of occurrence of
rare events required for a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). While a
Monte Carlo approach can be used to compute a full probability den-
sity function (PDF) of the system state, it is computationally expen-
sive and seldom used in three-dimensional transient models with a
large number of cross-correlated variables. Alternative approaches
based on PDF equations (Sanchez-Vila et al., 2009; Tartakovsky and
Broyda, 2010) can effectively reduce this computational burden but
these promising methods are still not readily available for real
applications.
The use of a formal PRA framework to predict the dynamics of dis-
tributed physical systems with uncertain parameters, modeled by
means of stochastic partial differential equations (SPDEs), and of
which subsurface flow and transport are prime examples, offers a
number of conceptual and computational advantages (Tartakovsky,
2007; Winter and Tartakovsky, 2008; Bolster et al., 2009). First, it al-
lows one to reduce the dimensionality of the parameter space, a pro-
cedure akin to stratified Monte Carlo sampling (see Helton and Davis,
2003). Second, it treats a subsurface environment as a complex sys-
tem, whose reliability and failure are reduced to those of its basic
events or “components”. This enables one to obtain a schematic
piece-by-piece description of risks posed by the system in a way
that allows for a seamless incorporation of stochastic models of sub-
surface processes into a global PRA framework.
The PRA approach we pursue in our analysis of risks posed by
groundwater to the integrity of underground construction is based
on a fault tree analysis (FTA). This approach consists of (1) defining
a system's failure, (2) identifying the key events that may lead to
this failure, (3) constructing a fault tree that visually displays paths
to failure, (4) mathematically representing these paths by means of
Boolean logic, which allows one to write the probability of the sys-
tem's failure in terms of those of the basic event, and (5) computing
the probabilities of such basic events. Surprisingly, while this proce-
dure is common in many engineering fields, these ideas have only
been recently introduced into analysis of groundwater related prob-
lems (Tartakovsky, 2007; Bolster et al., 2009; de Barros et al., 2011).
Our approach involves the simultaneous use of a number of
methods to compute the probability of basic events. These range
from stochastic modeling and data assimilation to statistical analysis
of historical data and expert judgment, the later being either of a
quantitative or qualitative nature. The risk analysis is framed in an
FTA, making it possible to study a complex system in a structured
and straightforward manner. The specific motivation for this work
comes from the construction of a new subway line in the Barcelona
metropolitan area (Spain). While the methodology is general, the
numbers presented here come from an example in this project.
2. Problem formulation
We start by considering a multilayered and isotropic subsurface
environment of constant thickness (from here on we indicate in
brackets the actual values used in the example, here being
b=40 m) with infinite lateral extent, selected as a prospective site
for an underground station. While this geologic setup is clear a sim-
plification of reality, we contend that it is a reasonable approach
when the size of the excavation is smaller than the horizontal corre-
lation length of hydraulic conductivity and larger than the vertical
one. Our goals are to quantify andminimize the risk posed by ground-
water seepage during the construction of the underground station.
The latter goal is important in the planning stages of the develop-
ment. Risk would be controlled by the uncertainties in processes
and parameters, regarding geological and hydraulic properties, but
also by construction or operational conditions. The standard approach
in engineering is to use representative values of parameters and to
design the system incorporating a safety factor. This factor is includedto account for uncertainties in the parameters, bad construction prac-
tices, and potential damages produced by unknown factors. The use
of a high safety factor results in an increase in the budget.
We start by describing the main characteristics of the site that will
be used as example in the risk assessment process. The hydrogeological
formation consists of a shallow aquifer and a main one, separated by a
silty-clayey aquitard (25 m thick) acting as a confining layer. The shal-
low aquifer is unconfined with a natural constant head (hs=2m).
Themain aquifer is thus hydraulically semiconfined with a natural con-
stant head (hm=−4 m) different than that of the phreatic aquifer. The
flow system at the site is at steady-state conditions, with water flowing
vertically downwards driven by the difference in hydraulic heads be-
tween the shallow and themain aquifers. This hydrologic system is sub-
divided into twelve distinct layers, whose characteristics are presented
in Table 1. While this geologic setup does not correspond to any partic-
ular location, it can be considered as a representative site of the city of
Barcelona.
Fig. 1 provides a vertical cross-section of the proposed construc-
tion site. A circular subway station is to be built between the shallow
and main aquifer. A station construction design calls for a partially
penetrating pumping well (radius rw=0.2 m) to be placed in the cen-
ter of the excavation zone, whose sides are to be aligned with a dia-
phragm wall (located at rexc=32 m). The well is screened so that it
does not exceed the bottom level of the diaphragm wall (up to
z=28 m below sea level, mbsl).This wall is embedded in the impervi-
ous layer. The bottom level of the diaphragm wall and the excavation
level are 29 and 14.5 mbsl, respectively. The design of the pumping
well included a deterministic stability assessment of the system
based on the average hydraulic properties of the layers. The final de-
sign considered that the water head at the pumping well should be
below hw=−19.5 m to prevent failure of the site.
Let us define the system failure (SF) more properly. It is defined as
the occurrence of wet conditions during the construction of an under-
ground station. Such conditions would require the construction
works to stop (economic implications), or even worse, lead to cata-
strophic failures. More specifically, we say that the system fails if
the groundwater level reaches or exceeds the excavation (at level
z=−14.5 m, see Fig. 1). A less conservative definition can easily be
implemented following the same approach. In order to avoid system
failure, the uncertainties of the events involved in our problem have
to be quantified.
We focus on three main events: (1) bottom excavation failure;
(2) lateral inflow, and (3) failure of the drainage system. We treat
each of these sources of failure as equally undesirable, so that failure
occurs when at least one of these three events take place. In subse-
quent analyses not carried here, weights of importance can be assigned
to each event, based on either potential economic loss, or else on opin-
ions of experts and/or decision makers, thus allowing for integration of
this methodology into a decision support system.
Fig. 1. Hydrogeological definition of the subsurface and schematic representation of the station construction design.
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Basic events, or factors that can contribute to system failure (SF),
are listed in Table 2. They fall into three broad categories: the failure
of the excavation bottom (BEF) may be due to a combination of blow-
in (BI), liquefaction (L), and bad drainage design (BD); the occurrence
of lateral inflow (LI) is caused mainly by poor construction of the
diaphragm walls; and the drainage system failure (DSF) with the
subsequent flooding of the excavation site can be produced by a com-
bination of the pumping well clogging (C), heavy rainfall (R) and
pump failure (PDW). Finally, the latter can be caused by the pump's
breakdown (PB), an accidental turn-off (ATO), or a power generator
failure (GF).
We use a fault tree (e.g., Bedford and Cooke, 2003) to represent
the relationship between system failure (SF) and the basic events
described in the previous paragraph (Fig. 2). This allows us to identify
nine minimal cut sets (the smallest collection of events that lead to
the system failure), each of which consisting of a single basic event:
BI, L, BD, LI, C, R, PB, GF and ATO. The system failure can now be repre-
sented by a Boolean equation as
SF ¼ BEFORLIORDSF ¼ BIORLORBDð ÞORLIOR CORPBORGFORATOORRð Þ; ð1ÞTable 2
List of basic events.
Event Abbreviation
Working in wet conditions SF
Bottom excavation failure BEF
Blow-in BI
Liquefaction L
Bad drainage design BD
Lateral inflow LI
Drainage system fails DSF
Clogging C
Pump does not work PDW
Rainfall R
Pump breaks PB
Generator fails GF
Accidental turn off ATOwhich allows one to compute the probability of system failure P [SF]
as
P SF½  ¼ P BEF∪LI∪DSF½ : ð2Þ
What remains to be done is to evaluate the probabilities of each of
the basic events. It is worthwhile emphasizing again that this approach
allows taking a completely different methodology to evaluate the
individual components; while some of them can be found in reliability
databases, others might be obtained from complicated models or even
as solutions of stochastic partial differential equations.
4. Probabilities of basic events
The basic events leading to system failure are both natural and
man-made. Consequently, the computation of the probabilities and
their occurrence requires a number of distinct approaches. In the
following we compute them by alternatively relying on stochastic
models, recent or historic databases, and expert judgment.
4.1. Bottom excavation failure (BEF)
Applying the inclusion–exclusion principle of probability, we can
compute P [BEF] as
P BEF½  ¼ P BI∪L∪BD½  ¼ P BI½  þ P L½  þ P BD½ −P BI∩L½ −P L∩BD½ 
−P BD∩BI½  þ P BI∩L∩BD½ : ð3Þ
Probabilities of the basic physical events, i.e., blow-in (BI), lique-
faction (L) and a bad drainage design (BD), are computed below.
4.1.1. Blow-in
When the pore water pressure in a soil, Pw, exceeds the vertical
total stress in the ground, the effective stress becomes zero and the
soil loses its strength, forming quick sands. The consequences can
be severe, causing valuable equipment to sink (Fig. 3a) and leading
to personal injuries or even worker deaths. In some cases, after
blow-in occurs the excavation has to be abandoned and another site
Fig. 2. Fault tree for system failure, which is defined as work in wet conditions.
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significant delays in a project.
Excavations beneath the water table can suffer from this phenom-
enon, which is known as “blow-in” of the excavation base, if the
water pressure is not sufficiently relieved. An excavation is consid-
ered safe as long as the vertical total stress in the ground σv exceeds
the pore water pressure. This gives rise to a “safety factor”,
FS ¼ σv=Pw; ð4Þ
which defines the excavation to be safe if FS>1. In practice, it is com-
mon to require safety factors greater than 1 in order to account for the
insufficient characterization of the system. The actual safety factor to
be imposed in the design is chosen depending on the uncertainty
associated with the site and the social and economical impact of a
potential failure.
In general, blow-in is more likely to occur in silty layers that have
a lower permeability compared to that of the adjacent layers since
hydraulic gradients are concentrated there in. Uncertainty in the
occurrence of blow-in stems from that in soil properties. We use
Monte Carlo simulations to quantify this uncertainty. First, a number
of equally likely realizations of permeability fields were generated by
randomly assigning a value to each of the 12 layers identified in
Table 1. The permeability of each layer was treated as an independent
lognormal random variable with a mean corresponding to that of the
local values obtained from measurements during the geological
survey of the area (Table 1), and a coefficient of variation (of the
log-K values) equal to 0.32. This variance was chosen based on com-
piled data from the Barcelona plain area. Second, for each realization
of the permeability field, flow simulations were conducted using the
finite element code Transin IV (Medina and Carrera, 2003) to com-
pute the minimum FS value that could occur at any geologic layer.
Finally, the results of these flow simulations were statistically ana-
lyzed to construct the histogram of FS, which is depicted in Fig. 4a.
Fig. 4b illustrates that it took approximately 3000 realizations for
the Monte Carlo simulations to converge. An FS value lower or
equal to 1 means that in this individual realization blow-in has
occurred.The flow simulations consider the worst flow case scenario in
which groundwater is at steady-state and hydraulic gradients are
fully developed. Also, we disregard the additional strength of the me-
dium (hardening) due to the dissipation of water pressure caused by
soil deformation resulting from the excavation and changes in water
pressure during flow. The finite element flow model (not shown) ex-
amines a representative 2D cross-sectional area of the construction
site, whose left boundary is limited by the pumping well while the
right boundary constitutes the far field. The latter avoids boundary ef-
fects by laterally extending the domain to 1000 m. Top and bottom
boundaries of the domain were assumed impermeable and delimited
by the aquifer top/bottom boundaries. Prescribed head conditions
were imposed at the pumping well and at the aquifer-bearing areas
of the side boundaries, in which natural head conditions were fixed.
No flow boundary conditions were prescribed elsewhere.
The Monte Carlo simulations allow us to estimate the probability
of occurrence of blow-in as P [BI]=0.218, which is relatively high
(see Fig. 4). Moreover, the skewed nature of the probability density
function of BI implies that a deterministic study relying on averaged
permeability values, which is the current “best engineering practice”,
would have missed the possibility of a blow-in. Another troublesome
finding is that the frequency with which the safety factor FS takes
values around 1 is quite large. This spike emerge naturally for the
given system parameters and highlights the delicate proximity to fail-
ure by blow-in of the specific location.
4.1.2. Liquefaction
Liquefaction is a phenomenon with similar consequences to blow-
in, i.e. the occurrence of quick sands. However it is typically generated
by the cyclic movements of high magnitude loads caused by earth-
quakes (Moh and Chin, 1993). For liquefaction to occur the soil
must be susceptible to liquefaction (loose saturated sand, located
close to the surface) and ground shaking must be sufficiently strong.
A number of strategies for evaluation of the liquefaction potential
of a given soil are reviewed in Idriss and Boulanger (2006). In order to
illustrate the potential effects of liquefaction, we consider the simpli-
fied procedure to evaluate soil liquefaction of Seed and Idriss (1971),
which postulates that liquefaction at a given point occurs when
the time-averaged horizontal shear stress τav exceeds the horizontal
Fig. 3. Consequences of (a) blow-in phenomenon during an underground excavation,
(b) open wide joints through which lateral inflow can occur, and (c) an erosion cavity.
Fig. 4. (a) Histogram of the system failure due to blow in, and (b) convergence of
Monte Carlo simulations with the number of realizations.
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typically found to be about 65% of the maximum shear stress devel-
oped during an earthquake
τav ¼ 0:65τmax; ð5Þ
which is in turn expressed in terms of the overburden total pressure
(σ0) as
τmax ¼
σ0
g
amaxrd; ð6Þ
where g is the acceleration of gravity; rd is a reduction coefficient that
accounts for the dissipation of stresses due to soil deformation, and
amax is the maximum ground surface acceleration, non-linearly related
to the magnitude of an earthquakeM. The shear stress causing liquefac-
tion τl depends on the overburden effective stress (σ′0) given by
τl ¼ RcrDrσ ′0 ð7Þwhere Dr is the relative density (dimensionless); cr is a correction factor
that depends on Dr and transforms laboratory triaxial test data to field
conditions; and R is the stress ratio derived from cyclic loading triaxial
tests, which depends on both the total number of cycles and soil
properties.
For a given M, liquefaction occurs if τav≥τl. Since the number of
cycles of an earthquake is determined by M, and since liquefaction
can be defined as amax exceeding a given threshold, liquefaction
potential can be defined as the probability that M exceeds a given
threshold M0. In other words,
P L½  ¼ P M > M0½  ¼ 1−F M0ð Þ: ð8Þ
It is normally assumed that F follows a Gumbel distribution with
parameters μ and β (see for instance Idriss and Boulanger, 2006) so
that
F M0; μ;βð Þ ¼ exp − exp − M0−μð Þ=βð Þð Þ; ð9Þ
In Barcelona plain the following combination takes place: first, the
probability of occurrence of high magnitude earthquakes is very small
(μ small), and second, the soil in Barcelona is little susceptible to
liquefaction caused by cyclic loads (M0 large). Such a combination re-
sults in F (M0) being very close to 1 regardless the choice of β. Thus,
we set P [L]=0, but in a general problem the impact of earthquakes
or, for that matter, other types of natural disasters (floods, hurricanes,
landslides, volcanoes, …) ought to be considered. It is worth noting
that the proposed model is a relatively simple one. For this reason
we found no need in evaluating the liquefaction potential of the
soil, which would involve a number of geotechnical tests. Should
the probability of liquefaction turn out to be high with the current
simplified model, one could then consider running the cyclic loading
triaxial tests or even using a more sophisticated modeling approach
that will provide a more rigorous result. This is in fact one of the ap-
pealing features of a fault tree analysis since it is easy to recalculate
the probability associated with each event without having to recalcu-
late probabilities for the entire complex system.
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The drainage system should be designed to ensure that the water
table remains at least one meter below the excavation level during
the excavation. We use Monte Carlo simulations (see the numerical
setup described in Section 4.1.1) to compute the probability of the
water table rising above this limit. Particular attention is paid to the
zones adjacent to the diaphragm wall, because they are the most un-
favorable zones (located furthest from the pumping well). The stan-
dard engineering practice during the design stages is to use the
average permeabilities of each layer, and to treat these values as cer-
tain. In reality though, these permeabilities are variable and highly
uncertain.
Uncertainty in permeability values renders predictions of ground-
water heads. Fig. 5 exhibits the normalized histogram of the relative
water level computed with Monte Carlo simulations. Results are
presented as differences between computed head and target level,
thus a negative value indicates that the water table is more than
1 m below the excavation level. The bulk of realizations lie in the
safe zone, but a fraction of them result in a positive value, which is
indicative of failure. From the ensemble of simulations the probability
of system failure due to a bad drainage design is P [BD]=0.228.
Monte Carlo simulations of blow-in in the presence of a poorly
designed drain yield the probability of system failure due to the
simultaneous occurrence of both blow-in and a bad drainage design
being P[BI∩BD]=0.011. This probability is relatively small compared
to the probability of the individual events, which suggests that they
are fairly mutually excluding and that the rare event approximation
(Bedford and Cooke, 2003) of Eq. (3) might be appropriate. Since
the probability of liquefaction is zero in our example, all other joint
probabilities in Eq. (3) are zero, resulting in P[BEF]=0.435. In other
works such joint probabilities must be included in the analysis.
4.2. Lateral inflow
Underground excavations in urban areas are usually surrounded
by retaining walls. These walls support the terrain outside the exca-
vation, so that (1) the area affected by the excavation is minimized,
and (2) impact on surrounding buildings (settlements, cracks) is
also minimized. Various types of materials for retaining walls exist.
However, none of these methods provide an entirely continuous im-
permeable medium and joints will exist. If these joints are not closed
and openings exist (Fig. 3b), groundwater will flow through, causing
wet working conditions and thus leading to system failure. Addition-
ally, open joints may lead to soil collapse and to formation of sink-
holes (Fig. 3c) (Shin et al., 2006).
The Barcelona urban area is home to a large number of current and
completed underground civil projects. Many previously used pump-
ing wells have been closed, which caused the water table to rise, in
some places reaching the levels of the existing underground con-
structions and inducing significant lateral inflow through the retain-
ing walls (Vázquez-Suñé et al., 2004).Fig. 5. Histogram of the system failure due to bad drainage design.The probability of the occurrence of lateral inflow is particularly
difficult to quantify, since it depends on the materials and technolo-
gies used at a particular construction site, regional conditions and
construction standards. Thus, we rely on a literature review and exist-
ing databases to estimate P [LI]. One drawback of literature reviews
associated with civil works is that sites that have suffered difficulties
are more likely to be documented than those that have not presented
problems. This drawback is not an issue in this case, because of our
access to raw data in the study region (Vázquez-Suñé et al., 2004;
Jurado et al., 2009; Vilarrasa et al., 2011; Font-Capó et al., 2011;
Pujades et al., 2011). Based on the information about the civil works
that have been conducted in the Llobregat Delta over the last ten
years, we estimate the probability that lateral inflow results in the
system failure as P [LI]=0.1.
4.3. Drainage system failure
The drainage system failure (DSF) can be caused by clogging of the
well (C), heavy rainfall (R), or by the pump stopping (PDW) (Fig. 2). It
follows from Eq. (1) that
P DSF½  ¼ P C∪R∪PDW½  ¼ P C½  þ P R½  þ P PDW½ −P C∩R½ −P R∩PDW½ 
−P PDW∩C½  þ P C∩R∩PDW½ :
ð10Þ
Probabilities of the basic events, clogging, rain and pump failure,
are computed below.
4.3.1. Clogging
Drainage of civil works is of a limited duration and the effort ded-
icated to proper well construction is usually minimized due to time
constraints. Additionally, a proper well development is often omitted.
Thus, pumping wells in practice are not always capable of draining
the designed groundwater outflow, or else they lose their efficiency
over time. Additionally, construction practices often cause or contrib-
ute to well failure.
The probability of well failure on a given day changes with time.
Initially a well can be either badly designed or badly constructed or
badly developed. Each of these construction steps might fail, leading
to a well that is not able to extract the designed amount of water.
Since the well is usually put into operation before the actual construc-
tion takes place, it is usually possible to correct these problems by ei-
ther constructing a new well or redeveloping the existing one. In
short, we can consider that the well is fully functioning at the begin-
ning of site excavation. But, when a well is pumping for long periods
of time, the drag of fine materials into the well screen may cause clog-
ging. Consequently, the probability of clogging increases with time.
This time-dependent probability is related to: (1) aquifer lithology,
and (2) time that the well has been pumping. Therefore, it is helpful
to have information of a specific site.
Based on the data collected from a large number of construc-
tion projects in the Barcelona area (Vázquez-Suñé et al., 2004;
Jurado et al., 2009; Vilarrasa et al., 2011; Font-Capó et al., 2011;
Pujades et al., 2011), we estimate the probability of clogging as P
[C]=0.186.
4.3.2. Rain
A heavy rainfall event might cause the system to fail provided that
the drainage system is not sufficient to evacuate the corresponding
amount of rain water. The likelihood of a heavy rainfall is determined
by local meteorological conditions, as inferred from local/regional
meteorological stations. A proper drainage design consists of a num-
ber of elements diverting water from the site and additional elements
that conduct water to an evacuation element, including a pumping
device that takes away the water into a surface water body or a seep-
age system.
Table 3
Probabilities of basic and intermediate events, and
probability of the system failure.
Probability Value
P [BI] 0.218
P [L] 0
P [BD] 0.228
P [BI ∩ BD] 0.011
P [BEF] 0.435
P [LI] 0.1
P [C] 0.186
P [PB] 0.15
P [GF] 0.08
P [ATO] 0.01
P [PDW] 0.226
P [R] 0.032
P [DSF] 0.39
P [SF] 0.69
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any single day, to avoid the accumulation of water at the site. A mete-
orological station located in Barcelona near the construction site used
as an example in this study provides a 30 year daily data set. During
this period, two heavy storms (defined as precipitation in excess of
100 mm in 24 h) were reported. The cutoff of 100 mm comes from
expert judgment and experience. This translates into a very small
probability for an individual rain event IRE to cause the system fail-
ure, P[IRE]=1.83·10−4. But in areas of frequent heavy rains, this
event may be significant and should be taken into account in order
to estimate the added costs of taking protective approaches against
(Yang et al., 2009).
Let m denote the total duration of the works until the system is
stabilized, or just until rain is no more an issue. Assuming that the
site can be affected by rain during these m days, and assuming for
the sake of simplicity that daily precipitation is an independent iden-
tically distributed random variable, the probability of failure due to
rain is
P R½  ¼ 1− 1−P IRE½ ð Þm: ð11Þ
This methodology is equivalent to calculating the probability of a
rain exceeding a given return period during the duration of a given
construction site. The daily probability could also be considered tem-
porally variable depending on the meteorological history of the site,
provided we know the exact starting date of the construction works
(e.g., accounting for summer/winter, monsoon periods, rain seasons,
…), could radically change the outcome.
In our example, taking six months (180 days) as the duration of
the excavation project, we obtain P [R]=0.032.
4.3.3. Pump failure
According to Fig. 2, pump failure (PDW) can be caused by any of
the following basic events: pump breakdown (PB), generator failure
(GF) and accidental turnoff (ATO). Its probability is given by
P PDW½  ¼ P PB∪GF∪ATO½  ¼ P PB½  þ P GF½  þ P ATO½ −P PB∩GF½ 
−P GF∩ATO½ −P ATO∩PB½  þ P PB∩GF∩ATO½ : ð12Þ
4.3.3.1. Pump breakdown (PB). The probability of pump failure, as that
of many manufactured components, can be defined by an exponential
cumulative distribution function over the lifetime of a pump, FX (t)≡P
[X≤ t]=1−exp (−λpt). This expression can be read as, the probabil-
ity that a pump with a lifetime X fails before time t (Bedford and
Cooke, 2003).
The expected or average life of the pump, 1/λp, can be evaluated
from the manufacturer specifications. In practice, the intense and de-
manding usage of pumps in civil works reduces this ideal average life.
Bad construction of wells is very common, resulting in fine particles
entering the pump. These working conditions can cause pumps to
break down quite frequently. In Barcelona it has been computed
that pumps fail on the order of once every eighteen months. As a re-
sult of experience to avoid breakdown, pump maintenance is con-
ducted about once every three months. Therefore, we take the mean
lifetime of the pump as 18 months and the maximum probability of
failure occurring at 3 months. This is equivalent to assuming that
maintenance restores the pump to ideal initial operating conditions
(see the discussion in Bolster and Tartakovsky, 2008), effectively set-
ting time to t=0 in Fx (t).While optimistic this assumption is in line
with observations and experience. This results in P [PB]=1−exp
(−1/6)=0.15, which is quite high, suggesting that better design or
more frequent maintenance may be justifiable.
4.3.3.2. Generator failure (GF). In practice the drainage systemmust be
running the whole day. The drainage system is powered by electricityfrom generators that use fuel. The generator can stop due to running
out of fuel or a mechanical breakdown. In many conditions this does
not pose a problem as a breakdown can be quickly and easily reme-
died. However, not all civil works have a 24/7 presence at the sites.
Thus, any problems that might occur with the generator during
non-working hours or holidays will not be solved until the next
morning, leading to system failure.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the generator will
always have enough fuel. Then the probability that the generator
fails can be expressed by an exponential cumulative distribution
function, FY (t)≡P [Y≤ t]=1−exp(−λgt). The average life of a gener-
ator, 1/λg, can be evaluated from the manufacturer specifications, and
it is usually on the order of 24 months. However, in the civil work
field, it is common for generators to be maintained once every two
months to avoid a mechanical failure of any type. Consequently, we
set P [PB]=1−exp (−1/12)=0.08.
4.3.3.3. Accidental turnoff (ATO). Civil works are often conducted in
tight spaces where heavy machines, construction materials, tools
and workers move. Often, a machine or an object can be hit acciden-
tally by another object. Pumping wells are placed in the center of the
excavation (in order to maximize the impact of pumping) and so
are susceptible to accidental bumps and damage. Based on the
knowledge gained in civil works in recent years in the Barcelona
area (Vázquez-Suñé et al., 2004; Jurado et al., 2009; Vilarrasa et al.,
2011; Font-Capó et al., 2011; Pujades et al., 2011) we set the proba-
bility of this unlikely event to P [ATO]=0.015.4.4. Probabilities of basic events and probability of failure
The probabilities of the basic events computed above are summa-
rized in Table 3. Assuming that all basic events, except for the blow-in
(BI) and a poor drainage design (BD), are independent, we use Eqs.
(3) and (10) to compute the probabilities of the intermediate events,
the bottom excavation failure (BEF) and the drainage system failure
(DSF), respectively. These are reported in Table 3. Finally, the proba-
bility of system failure is computed from Eq. (1) as P [SF]=0.69,
which is very high. This result highlights the importance of conduct-
ing PRA to determine the likelihood of failure due to groundwater re-
lated excavation engineering problems. In this case, reliance of the
“best engineering practice” is too risky.
The focus on the intermediate probabilities, P [BEF], P [LI], and P
[DSF], reveals some salient features of many underground excavation
projects and provides guidance to better engineering practices. First,
the high probability of the failure of the bottom of the excavation
site, P [BEF]=0.435, illustrates the importance of uncertainty quanti-
fication in a stochastic analyses of groundwater flow in the soil
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soil properties are likely to miss the potential danger.
Second, the probability of lateral inflow, P [LI]=0.1, is relatively
low. Improving this number requires the development of better
ground-improvement protocols and the implementation of stringent
construction standards. These measures are likely to carry significant
costs, but may well be worth the investment.
Third, the probability of drainage failure is also high, P [DSF]=
0.39. The events contributing to this probability are less catastrophic
than those associated with P [BEF], although they can cause disasters
if not attended quickly (e.g., Duann et al., 1997). Their consequences
tend to be more economic, leading to construction delays and higher
costs. Making a decision on whether to reduce these probabilities
requires a cost-benefit analysis that would balance the increased
costs of better equipment and a more rigorous maintenance schedule
against the time and money that can potentially be lost due to failure.
An example of such an analysis can be found in Bolster and
Tartakovsky (2008).
We repeated the analysis described above for the case where a
second pump is added to the site. We found that doing so reduces
the risk of system failure to about P [DSF]=0.325. Including a third
pump reduces it to around 0.16 and adding a fourth pump reduces
the risk of failure to just above 0.127, which is the minimum value
that can be attained without reducing the probabilities of failure asso-
ciated with lateral inflow (P [LI]) or extreme rainfall (P [R]). These re-
sults led to the construction managers of the subway line in Barcelona
to recommend the installation of redundant pumps along the line.
5. Sensitivity analysis
Among the basic events that can lead to system failure, only blow-
in has potentially catastrophic consequences, some of which are illus-
trated in Fig. 3a. While the occurrence during the construction of an
underground work of any other basic events can be mitigated with
an appropriate remedial action, the occurrence of a blow-in typically
causes the complete abandonment of the construction site. This is be-
cause the soil loses its mechanical strength and ability to bear the
structural loads.
As mentioned before, blow-ins typically occur in low permeability
layers located adjacent to permeable ones. For the site geology shown
in Fig. 1, this suggests that the critical layers are either layer 4 or 8,
both located in the aquitard formation. An analysis of our Monte
Carlo simulations reveals that blow-in occurs most frequently in
layer 8 (L8). A sample pressure distribution corresponding to one re-
alization where blow-in occurs, in L8 is shown in Fig. 6.
We conduct a sensitivity analysis to determine the critical perme-
ability of L8 to blow-in. It consists of the following steps. First, the
permeabilities of all the layers other than L8 are deterministicallyFig. 6. Water pressure profile before (blue solid line) and after (purple dashed line)
pumping at the inner face of the diaphragm wall in a realization where a blow-in
occurs. The red dash-dot line shows the vertical stress due to the soil after excavation.fixed to their respective average values. Then the permeability of L8
is incrementally varied over several orders of magnitude, with values
drawn from the lognormal PDF used in the Monte Carlo simulations.
The results are shown in Fig. 7, which allows one to identify the log
critical permeability, log Kc=−3.287, for which the safety factor
FS=1.
To evaluate the probability of encountering the log permeability
smaller than log Kc, i.e., the probability of the system failure due to
blow-in, we use the Gaussian cumulative distribution function
shown in Fig. 8. For the given permeabilities in the other layers, the
probability of blow-in in layer L8 is 0.172 (see Fig. 8). Comparing
this probability with the original Monte Carlo simulations that yield
the probability of 0.218, we observe that layer 8 accounts for 79% of
the risk of a blow-in. This suggests that it is desirable to invest extra
resources into characterizing this layer.
To reduce the risk of a blow-in, the water pressure at the bottom
of layer 8 should be reduced. One way of achieving this is to increase
the vertical penetration of the pumping well. For example, if the
pumping well were to reach layer 10 (more permeable than layer
8), pumping at this layer would reduce the water pressure at the bot-
tom of layer 8 Alternatively, a jet-grouting treatment could be per-
formed at the bottom and below the toe of the diaphragm wall,
which would increase the mechanical strength and reduce the per-
meability of the soil. The depth of the jet-grouting treatment would
be a new variable to account for in the risk analysis associated to
blow-in.
6. Summary and conclusions
We employed a probabilistic analysis to quantify the risks posed
by groundwater to an underground construction site. System failure
was defined as the occurrence of wet conditions at an excavation
site, a phenomenon that causes construction delays and can lead to
disastrous consequences. A construction site for a subway station of
the new subway line in Barcelona, Spain provides an illustration of
the general methodology. This site has experienced some of the ad-
verse effects of wet conditions.
We identify nine basic events that can cause the system to fail, and
group them into three categories: (1) failure of the bottom (floor) of
the excavation, which can occur by blow-in, liquefaction or a bad de-
sign of the drainage system; (2) lateral inflow, which is associated
with faulty construction of the surrounding protective barriers, and
(3) mechanical failure of the drainage system. These events were or-
ganized into a fault tree (Fig. 2), which allowed us to express the
probability of the system failure in terms of the probabilities of
basic events.
Probabilities of the basic events associated with groundwater flow
(i.e., the failure of the excavation floor) cannot be inferred from reli-
ability databases, since they are determined by a complex interplay
of soil heterogeneity and construction conditions at the site. We
used solutions of the stochastic groundwater flow equation in aFig. 7. Evaluation of the safety factor in the layer L8 for various permeabilities of that
layer at level 29.5 mbsl.
Fig. 8. The cumulative distribution function of log permeability (log K).
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events (e.g., the failure of the protective barrier) are so underspecified
by data as to defy a physically-based quantitative description. To esti-
mate their probabilities, we resort to expert knowledge gained from
the contractors working on underground construction projects in
the Barcelona area over the last decade. Finally, the probabilities of
mechanical failures were estimated from the assumed life-time prob-
ability density functions and databases or manufacturer information
on average lifetimes.
The estimated probability of system failure in the original design
was about 70%, indicating the need to perform changes in either de-
sign or operation to bring the risk down to a smaller value. Actually,
a wide array of improvement strategies could be considered, ranging
from a better design of the drainage system, to better maintenance
scheduling of equipment, to implementation of stricter standards as-
sociated with certain construction practices, or eventually to a com-
plete change in design. The selection of a particular improvement
strategy is to be based on a cost-benefit analysis, which would
weigh the additional costs of improvements against the costs of a
possible system failure. Within a decision support system, each
basic event can be assigned a weight in accordance with the potential
impact of its outcome. For example, the consequences of a blow-in
are much more severe than those of the mechanical failure of a
pump and should be avoided at much greater cost. The implementa-
tion of such a decision-support system is left for future research.
Since blow-in has the most severe consequences and its occur-
rence has a relatively high probability of 22%, we conducted a sensi-
tivity analysis to identify geological layers that cause most of the
blow-in events in our Monte Carlo simulations. This analysis enabled
us to identify several strategies for significantly reducing the risk of
such an event.
One of the primary conclusions of this study is the importance of
probabilistic modeling of groundwater flow at and near underground
construction sites. Deterministic analyses of the specific problem pre-
sented here are likely to show that the planned excavation procedures
are well designed and safe. However, this is not the case because of
the ubiquitous soil heterogeneity and uncertainty about soil properties.
A proper evaluation of risks should then be always considered. It is
important to note that this methodology is very inexpensive, and so
can be easily updated whenever new information about geology or
hydraulic properties arise during the actual works.Acknowledgments
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